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In November 2011, the presence of Salmonella 
Newport in a ready-to-eat watermelon slice was con-
firmed as part of a local food survey in England. In late 
December 2011, cases of S. Newport were reported in 
England, Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Ireland 
and Germany. During the outbreak, 63 confirmed 
cases of S. Newport were reported across all six coun-
tries with isolates indistinguishable by pulsed-field 
gel electrophoresis from the watermelon isolate. 
A subset of outbreak isolates were whole-genome 
sequenced and were identical to, or one single nucleo-
tide polymorphism different from the watermelon iso-
late. In total, 46 confirmed cases were interviewed of 
which 27 reported watermelon consumption. Further 
investigations confirmed the outbreak was linked to 
the consumption of watermelon imported from Brazil. 
Although numerous Salmonella outbreaks associated 
with melons have been reported in the United States 
and elsewhere, this is the first of its kind in Europe. 
Expansion of the melon import market from Brazil rep-
resents a potential threat for future outbreaks. Whole 
genome sequencing is rapidly becoming more acces-
sible and can provide a compelling level of evidence 
of linkage between human cases and sources of infec-
tion, to support public health interventions in global 
food markets.
Introduction
On 28 November 2011, as part of a local food sur-
vey, Public Health England (PHE; formerly the Health 
Protection Agency) Food Water and Environment 
(FWE) Laboratory in Preston, England, confirmed the 
presence of Salmonella in a ready to eat watermelon 
slice purchased from a major supermarket retailer. 
The isolate was sent to the Gastrointestinal Bacteria 
Reference Unit (GBRU) at Colindale, London who 
reported it as Salmonella enterica subspecies enterica 
serovar Newport on 6 December 2011. On 13 December 
2011, the result was communicated through the Rapid 
Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) of the European 
Commission [1].
In late December 2011, Health Protection Scotland 
(HPS) reported four cases of S. Newport, all with the 
same pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) profile 
which had not previously been seen. Concurrently 
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, reporting 
of S. Newport infections exceeded expected levels. 
Molecular analysis of isolates from the human cases 
from all four countries indicated a PFGE profile indis-
tinguishable from the sliced watermelon isolate.
On 13 January 2012, Germany reported through the 
Epidemic Intelligence Information System (EPIS) at the 
European Centre of Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) fourteen S. Newport isolates that were indis-
tinguishable from the PFGE profile of the sliced water-
melon isolate. Four cases with this profile were also 
reported in Ireland in January 2012.
A multi-agency outbreak control team (OCT) was 
convened on 16 January 2012 comprising staff from 
PHE, Public Health Wales (PHW), HPS and the United 
Kingdom (UK) Food Standards Agency (FSA). There 
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were separate communications with the Robert Koch 
Institute (RKI) regarding the German cases and with the 
Health Protection Surveillance Centre (HPSC) and the 
National Salmonella, Shigella and Listeria Reference 
Laboratory (NSSLRL) regarding cases from Ireland. 
German and Irish public health and food safety author-
ities subsequently joined the OCT.
The aims of investigations were to gather and collate 
information on exposures, to identify the potential 
source(s), to institute immediate control measures and 
to determine if there were any lessons to be learnt 
regarding future prevention.
We describe an outbreak of S. Newport across six coun-
tries linked to the consumption of watermelon originat-
ing from Brazil.
Methods
Epidemiological investigations
Case ascertainment
Surveillance data from each of the six countries were 
reviewed for 2011. Exceedances in S. Newport cases 
were detected in December 2011. Therefore it was 
decided to perform pulsed-field gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE) analysis on all S. Newport cases identified from 
31 October 2011 onwards to account for any outbreak 
cases that might have arisen in the weeks prior to the 
exceedance indicator being triggered.
Case definition
Outbreak cases were defined as persons with: (i) labo-
ratory-confirmed infection with fully antimicrobial-sen-
sitive S. Newport exhibiting the outbreak PFGE profile 
designated as SNEWXB.0110 (defined by the water-
melon isolate); (ii) symptoms including diarrhoea or 
any two or more of: vomiting, fever or abdominal pain; 
(iii) onset of illness between 31 October 2011 and 31 
January 2012; and (iv) who was reported in any of the 
six countries.
Food-borne illness questionnaire
In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, upon notifica-
tion of Salmonella cases to PHE centre’s (PHEC’s), cases 
are routinely followed up by the PHEC and Environmental 
Health Officers (EHOs) in local authorities; Cases were 
contacted and asked to complete either the Salmonella 
or the generic food-borne illness questionnaire. While 
questionnaire formats varied between local authori-
ties, all sought information on clinical, travel and food 
history in the seven days before illness. Specific ques-
tions around fruit consumption were not included. 
During the outbreak completed questionnaires were 
returned to epidemiologists in the Gastrointestinal, 
Emerging and Zoonotic Infections Department (GEZI), 
PHE, Colindale, where they were reviewed to elucidate 
commonality of exposures between cases.
Outbreak case exposure questionnaire
Following the first OCT meeting on 16 January 2012, 
a questionnaire was designed to collect information 
specifically on fruit consumption and was shared with 
each member country of the OCT. The questionnaire 
gathered detailed information on consumption of dif-
ferent types of fruit, including melon, and addressed 
whether products were pre-packaged, sliced, cubed, 
mixed with other fruit and where they were purchased 
and consumed. Cases in England, Wales, Northern 
Ireland and Ireland were interviewed by designated 
investigators using the bespoke questionnaire. Cases 
were not followed up if contact details were unobtain-
able. Attempted contact was made on a maximum of 
five occasions, at which point they were designated as 
being lost to follow-up.
The same questionnaire was used for cases in England, 
Wales, Northern Ireland and Ireland to interview cases. 
In Scotland, the questionnaire was completed retro-
spectively by investigators at HPS using information 
collected in interviews with EHOs. In Germany, cases 
were interviewed using a translation of the question-
naire supplied by the UK OCT with additional, more 
detailed questions on food history in the three days 
before disease onset.
Analytical comparison of watermelon consumption
To estimate the frequency of watermelon consump-
tion in a group of persons in Germany unaffected by 
S. Newport infection, staff members included in the 
official mailing list of one of the RKI departments were 
invited via email to participate in an ad-hoc survey 
on 25 January 2012. The survey included the ques-
tion whether any watermelon had been consumed in 
December 2011. The proportion of persons reporting 
watermelon consumption among interviewed outbreak 
cases (in the three days before symptom onset) and 
among RKI department staff members were compared. 
Odds ratios (OR) and corresponding 95% confidence 
intervals (CI) were calculated and statistical signifi-
cance (p<0.05) was evaluated using Fisher’s exact test. 
Data analysis was performed using Stata 12 (Stata 
Corporation, College Station, United States).
In the UK, the FSA extracted data on watermelon con-
sumption from the UK National Diet and Nutrition 
Survey dataset for comparison with cases [2]. UK case 
consumption data were insufficient to support statisti-
cal analyses.
Microbiological investigations
Isolates from patients and food samples were charac-
terised and compared. In England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, all isolates were sent to GBRU; isolates in 
Scotland to the Scottish Salmonella, Shigella, and 
Clostridium Difficile Reference Laboratory; in Ireland to 
the NSSLRL and in Germany to the National Reference 
Centre for Salmonella and other Bacterial Enteric 
Pathogens at the RKI, Wernigerode.
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All isolates were serotyped according to the White-
Kauffmann-LeMinor scheme [3]. Antimicrobial resist-
ance profiles were determined by testing against a 
routine panel of antimicrobials in each Reference 
Laboratory. Each reference laboratory tested for 
ampicillin, cefotaxime, chloramphenicol, cipro-
floxacin, gentamicin, kanamycin, nalidixic acid, 
streptomycin, tetracyclines and trimethoprim/tri-
methoprim-sulfamethoxazole resistance as well as a 
range of additional antibiotics depending on the par-
ticipating laboratory. Cut-off values according to the 
European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility 
Testing (http://www.eucast.org) were used in Germany 
and Ireland. For isolates received by GBRU and in the 
Scottish reference laboratory, cut-off values were used 
as previously described on the basis of long-term stud-
ies [4-5].
PFGE using the PulseNet-Europe/Salm-gene proto-
col was performed on all S. Newport isolates from 
patients with an onset of illness date reported during 
the outbreak period (31 October 2011 to 31 January 
2012) [6]. The PFGE profile from the watermelon isolate 
was designated the outbreak profile (SNWPXB.0110). 
Comparisons between profiles were analysed using 
algorithms within the BioNumerics software package 
(version 6.10; Applied Maths, Sint-Martens-Latem, 
Belgium). Dendrograms were constructed using the 
Dice similarity coefficient and the unweighted pair 
group method with arithmetic averages (UPGMA). The 
PFGE images of the outbreak strain were shared with 
PulseNet US and PulseNet Latin America. The results 
of PFGE analysis together with antimicrobial resistance 
profiles were used to inform case definitions.
A subset of isolates from UK cases were selected for 
whole genome sequencing (WGS). This included 24 
of 37 outbreak isolates from UK cases and the iso-
late from the watermelon slice. An additional 11 non-
outbreak isolates were selected for comparison. 
Genomic DNA was extracted using the Wizard Genomic 
DNA Purification Kit (Promega), and samples were 
sequenced using multiplex libraries on the HiSeq plat-
form (Illumina) using 100 bp paired-end reads. The 
sequence data were aligned to the reference strain 
S. Newport SL254 (hereafter, SL254) along with its 
associated plasmids pSL254_3 and pSN254 (acces-
sion numbers CP001113, CP001112 and CP000604, 
respectively) using SMALT v0.6.4 [7]. Single nucleo-
tide polymorphisms (SNPs) was compared to the ref-
erence strain and a maximum likelihood phylogeny 
of the isolates was constructed using RAxML [8-9]. A 
high divergence between the outbreak isolates and the 
reference SL254 was observed, with ca 50,600 SNPs 
separating the outbreak isolates from the reference 
SL254. To improve resolution, the outbreak isolates, 
Figure 1
Epidemic curve based on onset weeka of confirmed Salmonella Newport outbreak casesb in the United Kingdom, Ireland 
and Germany, 31 October 2011–22 January 2012 (n=61)
a For two cases in Wales and one in England, onset date was not known and specimen date was used.
b Excludes one asymptomatic case from Ireland and one German case where neither onset nor specimen date were reported. In total, 61 
confirmed cases are included.
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along with four non-outbreak isolates used as outli-
ers, were re-mapped against the unordered assembly 
of the sliced watermelon isolate. De novo assembly of 
the watermelon isolate was undertaken using Velvet 
with a k-mer of 61, without scaffolding, giving an N50 
of 301,843 and 192 nodes [10].
Traceback investigations
Following isolation of S. Newport from the watermelon 
slice, the FSA undertook product traceback. The Food 
Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) also performed trace-
back investigations into the source of watermelon con-
sumed by a family cluster.
In Germany, traceback investigations were coordi-
nated at the federal level by the Federal Institute for 
Risk Assessment (Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung 
(BfR)). They started from five supermarket branches of 
one chain, where cases had purchased watermelons. 
Information on the immediate provider of watermelons 
was obtained through delivery documents provided by 
the stores to local veterinary offices. Watermelon deliv-
eries were then further traced back stepwise by the 
federal states authorities and the BfR. The distribution 
chain was determined to originate from a single water-
melon distributor in the Netherlands. The Federal Office 
of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (Bundesamt 
für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit, 
(BVL)) in Germany then contacted food safety authori-
ties in the Netherlands to obtain further information on 
the origin of the watermelons distributed by the Dutch 
company.
Results
Epidemiological investigations
Outbreak description
Between all six countries a combined total of 63 con-
firmed outbreak cases were reported with onset 
dates during the outbreak period (31 October 2011 to 
31 January 2012): 31 in England, four in Wales, two in 
Northern Ireland, five in Scotland, four in Ireland, and 
17 in Germany.
Onset dates ranged from 5 November 2011 to 19 January 
2012, with almost half (29/61) of these between the 28 
November and 11 December 2011 (Figure 1).
Cases were predominantly female (45/63) and ranged 
in age from six months to 95 years, with the great-
est number (15/63) in children aged five years or less. 
In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, cases were 
distributed across all regions, with a predominance 
of cases in the east (7/37) and south-west (5/37) of 
England. In Germany, cases were reported from seven 
federal states across the country.
In total, 14 cases were hospitalised: three in England, 
two in Wales, one in Ireland and eight in Germany. 
There were three fatalities: one in England (aged 56 
years) and two in Germany (aged 92 and 95 years); all 
three had underlying health conditions (cancer or car-
diovascular disease).
Case exposures
In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, completed 
EHO questionnaires were received for 22 of 37 con-
firmed cases, including 11 who reported consumption 
of fruit and one who specified melon.
In total, 46 of 63 confirmed cases were interviewed 
using the outbreak case exposure questionnaire, 
including 19 cases from England, four from Wales, two 
from Northern Ireland four from Scotland, four from 
Ireland and 13 from Germany (Table). Of the remaining 
17 cases not interviewed, three were deceased, five did 
not respond, contact details were unavailable for six, 
two refused consent to be interviewed and one had an 
onset date in early November and was not followed up 
due to the long time period which had elapsed.
Consumption of pre-packed, pre-sliced or whole water-
melon was reported by 59% of interviewed cases. In 
Ireland, three of the four cases were a family cluster 
who reported purchasing a whole melon which they 
sliced and consumed at home. The fourth case had no 
history of watermelon consumption.
An additional two cases in Germany reported possi-
ble consumption of watermelon. The remaining fifteen 
cases reported no consumption of watermelon, two of 
them reported consumption of other types of melon 
(Galia and Cantaloupe).
In follow-up interviews with cases from England and 
Northern Ireland, retailer information was reported for 
21 confirmed cases. All four of the largest UK super-
market retailers were reported as well as independ-
ent green grocers, and their proportions were largely 
Table 
Reporting of watermelon consumption among confirmed 
cases of Salmonella Newport of the outbreak profile 
interviewed in the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Germany, 31 October 2011–22 January 2012 (n=63)
Country
Number of 
outbreak 
cases
Number 
of cases 
interviewed 
Reported 
watermelon 
consumption
England 31 19 13 
Scotland 5 4 4 
Wales 4 4 0 
Northern Ireland 2 2 1 
Ireland 4 4 3 
Germany 17 13 6 a 
All countries 63 46 27 
a Two additional cases reported ‘possible’ consumption of 
watermelon.
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reflective of their market shares. In Scotland, one other 
retailer was cited by consumers, which was not reported 
by cases elsewhere in the UK. The German cases with 
confirmed watermelon consumption reported five dif-
ferent branches of one supermarket chain where they 
had purchased watermelon which was sliced in store.
Analytical comparison of watermelon consumption
Of 168 persons included in the RKI department staff 
emailing list, 91 (54%) replied. Of the persons who 
could remember whether they had consumed water-
melon (n=87), seven (8%) affirmed consumption. This 
compares to 46% (6/13) of the German cases inter-
viewed who remembered watermelon consumption 
(Table) and corresponds to an OR of 9.8 (95% CI: 2.6–
37.3, two-sided p value <0.01).
Data on watermelon consumption extracted from 
the 2008–10 UK National Diet and Nutrition Survey 
dataset indicated that the level of reported water-
melon consumption in the UK is normally 5–10% [9]. 
Consumption reported by cases (64%) was therefore 
considerably higher than would be expected in the 
general population.
Microbiological investigations
A single strain of S. Newport was found to be involved in 
this outbreak, with the novel PFGE profile SNWPXB.0110 
(Figure 2). Retrospective analysis of S. Newport isolates 
detected in cases in England and Wales (n=91) before 
the outbreak period revealed no isolates with the same 
profile. Furthermore, no matches were found to this 
profile in PulseNet US or Latin America databases. All 
isolates were fully susceptible to the antimicrobials 
tested. WGS revealed identical sequences between 
the watermelon isolate and 19 of the 24 sequenced 
outbreak isolates from the UK. The remaining five 
sequenced isolates differed from the watermelon iso-
late by just one SNP. The non-outbreak strains differed 
by several thousand SNPs (Figure 3).
Traceback
In the UK, product follow-up of the contaminated water-
melon slice indicated the product originated from a 
batch of watermelons imported from Brazil with a use-
by date of 25 November 2011. The watermelons from 
which the slice was produced had been supplied whole 
to a major UK processor where they were sliced, pack-
aged and distributed. Salmonella was not detected in 
subsequent raw material or packed product that was 
sampled at the processor’s premises. As the use-
by date of the affected batch had expired before the 
detection of S. Newport infections, no action could be 
taken to recall or withdraw the product. Further inves-
tigations were undertaken following human cases in 
Scotland in late December 2011. The confirmed cases 
in Scotland reported a different retailer from the one 
implicated in November, and traceback indicated a 
separate supply chain which did not involve the same 
UK processor. However, the melons were sourced from 
the same region in Brazil but from a different grower.
The FSAI performed a traceback on the watermelon 
consumed by the family cluster in Ireland. It had arrived 
in a shipment from Brazil and further work traced it 
back to the same source as the watermelon slice found 
positive for the outbreak strain in November 2011. The 
watermelons had been harvested on 25 October 2011, 
dispatched on 31 October 2011 and arrived in Dublin on 
21 November 2011. The entire consignment was distrib-
uted between 1 December and 31 December 2011, con-
sistent with the latest onset date in early January 2012. 
No action was necessary as the implicated product was 
no longer on sale in Ireland.
German authorities traced back watermelons from five 
supermarket branches of one chain where cases had 
reported purchasing watermelon, to a distributor in 
the Netherlands. From there, watermelons were traced 
back to the same grower in Brazil associated with the 
contaminated watermelon slice and the Irish cases and 
to an affiliated grower working together in a co-opera-
tive in the same geographical region in Brazil.
Discussion
Molecular, epidemiological, and traceback investiga-
tions identified a multi-country outbreak of S. Newport 
Figure 2
Representative pulsed-field gel electrophoresis profile of Salmonella Newport isolates from confirmed outbreak cases (n=4) 
and the watermelon sample, United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany, 31 October 2011–22 January 2012
Northern Ireland     Human
England and Wales    Human
England and Wales     Watermelon
Scotland      Human
Germany      Human
S. Braenderup (H9812)  Reference strain
6 www.eurosurveillance.org
gastroenteritis linked to consumption of watermelon 
imported from Brazil.
Molecular analysis determined the contaminated 
watermelon strain and human isolates from confirmed 
cases in the UK, Ireland and Germany indistinguishable 
from one another by PFGE and, for a subset, by WGS. 
In this outbreak investigation, epidemiological stud-
ies were successfully informed by analyses of PFGE 
data. The source of infection was confirmed through 
standard food traceback investigations. We used this 
opportunity to examine and evaluate the use of WGS for 
the purposes of food-borne outbreak investigation. We 
found that using WGS data, we were able to describe 
with greater clarity the relatedness of strains isolated 
from cases and watermelons and also demonstrate the 
scale of difference between these organisms and other 
S. Newport strains concurrently circulating in Europe. 
While it could be deduced from the traceback inves-
tigations that the outbreak strain was not European 
in origin, the WGS data provided objective evidence 
to confirm the scale of genetic difference between 
Figure 3
Phylogeny of Salmonella Newport isolates from the sliced watermelon, confirmed outbreak cases (n=24) and non-outbreak 
cases (n=4), United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany, 31 October 2011–22 January 2012
S. Newport cases mapped to reference sequence SL254.
Inset: isolates mapped to the assembly of the sequence from the watermelon isolate. Scale bars represent divergence in the number of single 
nucleotide polymorphisms.
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imported and indigenous strains. Understanding these 
effects should help inform future food-borne outbreak 
investigations where WGS data analyses could be used 
to provide important clues as to the geographic origins 
of implicated food vehicles, which in turn could feed 
back into hypothesis generation.
As costs decline, and the speed and fidelity of sequenc-
ing improve, WGS is becoming an increasingly accessi-
ble element of public health microbiology. It has been 
postulated that WGS may soon replace conventional 
typing in the investigation and management of out-
breaks [11]. WGS can provide a level of evidence of link-
age between specific sources of infection and human 
cases that is close to irrefutable. In view of the sensitiv-
ity of reputation for food business operators and food-
producing countries, this level of evidence is important 
in gaining support for intervention measures to protect 
public health. Furthermore, as genome databases of 
major food-borne pathogens expand it is reasonable 
to expect detection of previously unrecognised links 
between cases of infection and complex food chains. 
The challenge for public health microbiology laborato-
ries is to achieve the capacity for rapid sequence deter-
mination, data storage and analysis that will allow full 
exploitation of this powerful new approach [12].
Traceback investigations identified Brazilian watermel-
ons as a common factor in cases associated with the 
outbreak. Consumption of watermelon was reported by 
a high proportion of cases across all six countries as 
compared to the general population [2]. The German 
convenience sample also indicated a higher level of 
consumption of watermelon in outbreak cases than 
their controls. However, recall and selection bias may 
have led to some underestimation of consumption in 
the study population.
Cases occurred over a number of weeks and, as 
identified by traceback, storage and distribution of 
watermelon spans several weeks. Cases declined 
in February, coinciding with the end of the Brazilian 
watermelon importation season. The UK Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Statistics 
team and the Rural Payment Agency’s Horticultural 
Marketing Inspectorate indicated that the season for 
imported Brazilian watermelons runs from August to 
February in the UK.
The same melon grower was associated with the 
contaminated watermelon slice and human cases in 
Ireland and Germany. The melons associated with the 
Scottish cases were traced back to a different grower 
in the same region. However, the isolates from Scottish 
cases shared a common sequence with the other cases, 
therefore it is likely that Brazilian watermelons from a 
particular area were the vehicle, but that these were 
not confined to one specific grower.
Cases reported consumption of watermelons whole, 
pre-packaged and sliced, alone, or as part of fruit 
salads or melon mixtures, indicating the melons them-
selves were contaminated and contamination did not 
occur during processing. Furthermore, different retail-
ers, with different importers, processors and distribu-
tors were reported, also precluding these as the source 
of contamination. It is not possible to confirm at what 
point contamination occurred but there is likely to have 
been a common source of S. Newport which contami-
nated the produce at an unidentified point between 
growing and distribution.
In the United States (US) and Canada, melons have 
consistently been linked to outbreaks of Salmonella 
[13-17]. Three multistate outbreaks of S. Poona infec-
tion associated with eating cantaloupe melons 
imported from Mexico occurred in three consecutive 
years during the spring of 2000, 2001 and 2002 [18]. 
In 2011, in the US, a multistate outbreak of S. Panama 
linked to cantaloupe melons harvested in Guatemala 
occurred between February and April [19]. Outbreaks 
of salmonellosis linked to melons have also occurred 
in Australia in 2006 and New Zealand in 2009 [20-21].
This is the first outbreak of salmonellosis in Europe 
associated with melons from South America. Given 
that this is a ready-to-eat product, and that salmonel-
lae have the ability to attach to or enter into vegeta-
bles and fruits, it is likely that these produce items are 
potential sources for future outbreaks of salmonellosis 
[15]. The watermelon market has been developed by 
Brazil in recent years and Brazilian exports to the UK 
have been around 6,000 tonnes per annum in recent 
years. Brazil also exports similar quantities to Germany 
and the Netherlands [data not shown].
Recurrent outbreaks such as the one described here 
highlight the importance of good agricultural practices 
and hygiene manufacturing controls from the grower 
to the consumer. As a consequence of repeated RASFF 
notifications dealing with contaminated watermelons 
from Brazil, 10% of shipments of watermelons imported 
from Brazil into the European Union have been tested 
for Salmonella since January 2013 [22].
The use of standardised case exposure questionnaires 
and the use of PFGE and WGS to recognise outbreaks 
more easily, would improve both their timely detection 
and control. Our use of genome sequencing information 
and PFGE demonstrated the ability of these techniques 
to unequivocally link cases which would have been 
impossible to connect using limited available traceback 
information. Informal (PulseNet International, EPIS) and 
formal (European Early Warning and Response System 
and RASFF) communication platforms enabled the full 
geographical extent of the outbreak to be rapidly rec-
ognised and exemplify their use as valuable media for 
informing public health experts. International trade 
in food will always provide the opportunity for infec-
tions to appear far from the source of contamination. 
We have the tools to identify and respond to such out-
breaks and their use should be maximised.
8 www.eurosurveillance.org
Acknowledgements
In addition to all members of the outbreak control team, 
the OCT in Germany would like to thank local and state 
health and food safety authorities for their support. We 
would like to thank microbiologists and staff from the HPA 
Gastrointestinal Bacteria Reference Unit and the Scottish 
Salmonella, Shigella and Clostridium difficile Reference 
Laboratory and also the patients for their collaboration in 
providing data.
The sequencing work in this paper was supported by 
Wellcome Trust grant WT076964 through funding from The 
Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute
Conflict of interest
None declared.
Authors’ contributions
LB: managed data collection and collation for cases in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland and wrote the draft 
manuscript. IF: coordinated the local public health response, 
contributed to data collation, read and revised the draft 
manuscript and approved the final version. TP: was respon-
sible for molecular analysis and interpretation of labora-
tory results for isolates from England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, reviewed the manuscript and approved the final 
version. AM and NT: Designed and performed phylogenetic 
analysis and provided results, contributed to drafting the 
manuscript, made revisions, and approved the final version. 
HB and BR: were the principle investigators in Germany and 
made substantial contributions to study conception and de-
sign, data collection, analysis and interpretation. Both criti-
cally revised the manuscript and approved the final version. 
PM: collected data in Ireland and coordinated the Irish public 
health response. MC performed laboratory testing in Ireland, 
read and revised the manuscript. JC: collected and co-ordi-
nated data from Scotland and contributed to the public 
health response. VA assisted in study design and undertook 
data collection. CL contributed to study design, coordinated 
the initial UK public health response, and critically reviewed 
the manuscript.
International Outbreak Control Team
Joanne Aish, Goutam Adak, Victor Aiyedun, Derek Brown, 
Lynda Browning, Paul Cook, Cecilia Ellis, Andrew Fox, 
Elizabeth de Pinna, Patricia Garvey, Kathie Grant, Dorothy 
Guina-Dornan, Petra Hiller, Colin Houston, Naomi Launders, 
Burkhard Malorny, Brendan O’Brien, Beatrice Pfefferkorn, 
Rita Prager, Wolfgang Rabsch, Roland Salmon, Robert Smith, 
Brian Smyth, Kirsten Stone and Heidi Wichmann-Schauer.
References
1. Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF). Brussels: 
European Commission. [Accessed: 1 Aug 2014]. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/rasff/portal/index_en.htm
2. Whitton C, Nicholson SK, Roberts C, Prynne CJ, Pot GK, 
Olson A, et al. National Diet and Nutrition Survey: UK food 
consumption and nutrient intakes from the first year of the 
rolling programme and comparisons with previous surveys. 
Br J Nutr. 2011:106(12):1899-914. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0007114511002340
3. Grimont PAD, Weill FX. Antigenic formulas of the Salmonella 
serovars. 9th ed. Paris: World Health Organization 
Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on 
Salmonella, Institut Pasteur; 2007. Available from: http://
www.pasteur.fr/ip/portal/action/WebdriveActionEvent/
oid/01s-000036-089
4. Frost JA. Testing for resistance to antimicrobial drugs. In: Chart 
H, editor. Methods in practical laboratory bacteriology. New 
York: CRC Press; 1994. pp. 73-82.
5. Browning LM, Brown DJ, Coia JE, Cowden JM, Mather H. 
Antimicrobial resistance of Salmonella in Scotland, 2005 
(excluding S. Typhi and S. Paratyphi). HPS Weekly Report. 
2007;21 (41):172. Accessed 1 Aug 2014. Available from: http://
www.documents.hps.scot.nhs.uk/ewr/pdf2007/0721.pdf
6. Peters TM, Berghold C, Brown D, Coia J, Dionisi AM, Echeita 
A, et al. Relationship of pulsed-field profiles with key phage 
types of Salmonella enterica serotype Enteritidis in Europe: 
results of an international multi-centre study. Epidemiol 
Infect. 2007;135(8):1274-81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0950268807008102
7. Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute (WTSI). SMALT. Hinxton: WTSI. 
[Accessed: 1 Aug 2014]. Available from: http://www.sanger.
ac.uk/resources/software/smalt/
8. Harris SR, Feil EJ, Holden MT, Quail MA, Nickerson EK, 
Chantratita N, et al. Evolution of MRSA during hospital 
transmission and intercontinental spread. Science. 
2010;327(5964):469-74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/
science.1182395
9. Stamatakis A. RAxML-VI-HPC: maximum likelihood-based 
phylogenetic analyses with thousands of taxa and mixed 
models. Bioinformatics. 2006;22(21):2688-90. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1093/bioinformatics/btl446
10. Zerbino DR, Birney E. Velvet: algorithms for de novo short 
read assembly using de Bruijn graphs. Genome Res. 
2008;18(5):821-9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/gr.074492.107
11. Sabat AJ, Budimir A, Nashev D, Sá-Leão R, van Dijl JM, Laurent 
F, et al. Overview of molecular typing methods for outbreak 
detection and epidemiological surveillance. Euro Surveill. 
2013;18(4):pii=20380
12. Achtman M, Wain J, Weill F-X, Nair S, Zhou Z, Sangal V, et al. 
Multilocus Sequence Typing as a Replacement for Serotyping in 
Salmonella enterica. PLoS Pathog. 2012;8(6):e1002776. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1002776
13. Bowen A, Fry A, Richards G, Beuchat L. Infections associated 
with cantaloupe consumption: a public health concern. 
Epidemiol Infect. 2006;134(4):675-85. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1017/S0950268805005480
14. Gayler GE, MacCready RA, Reardon JP and McKernan BF. An 
outbreak of salmonellosis traced to watermelon. Public Health 
Rep. 1955:70(3):311-3. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4589055
15. Hanning IB, Nutt JD, Ricke SC. Salmonellosis outbreaks in the 
United States due to fresh produce: sources and potential 
intervention measures. Foodborne Pathog Dis. 2009;6(6):635-
48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/fpd.2008.0232
16. Blostein J. An outbreak of Salmonella Javiana associated with 
consumption of watermelon. J Environ Health. 1993;56(1):29-31.
17. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Foodborne 
outbreak online database (FOOD). Atlanta: CDC. [Accessed: 
1 Aug 2014]. Available from: http://wwwn.cdc.gov/
foodborneoutbreaks/Default.aspx
18. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Multistate 
outbreaks of Salmonella serotype Poona infections associated 
with eating cantaloupe from Mexico--United States and 
Canada, 2000-2002. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 
2002;51(46):1044-7.
19. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).Investigation 
update: Multistate outbreak of Salmonella Panama infections 
linked to cantaloupe. Atlanta: CDC; 2011. Available from: 
http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/panama0311/062311/index.
html
20. Munnoch SA, Ward K, Sheridan S, Fitzsimmons GJ, 
Shadbolt CT, Piispanen JP, et al. A multi-state outbreak of 
Salmonella Saintpaul in Australia associated with cantaloupe 
consumption. Epidemiol Infect. 2009;137(3):367-74. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0950268808000861
21. McCallum L, Torok M, Dufour MT, Hall A, Cramp G. An 
outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium phage type 1 associated 
with watermelon in Gisborne, January 2009. N Z Med J. 
2010;123(1322):39-45.
22. European Commission. Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No 1235/2012 of 19 December 2012 amending Annex I to 
Regulation (EC) No 669/2009 implementing Regulation (EC) No 
882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards the increased level of official controls on imports of 
certain feed and food of non-animal origin. Brussels: European 
Commission; 2012. L 350/44-50. Available from: http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:350:0044
:0050:EN:PDF 
